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Abstract
Purpose of the study: The main objective of this study is basically to investigate the impact of rule of law on FDI 
inflow for a panel of six selected SSA countries comprising, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Senegal, Nigeria, Congo Republic, and 
Sudan. 
Methodology: The study utilized the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) dynamic heterogeneous panel approach covering the 
period 1996 – 2017.  
Main Findings: The results indicate that adherence to the rule of law is directly related to the inflow of FDI in the 
selected countries in the long-run, whereas its impact is insignificant on FDI during the short-run.  
Applications of this study: The study is useful to SSA countries since it will provide policymakers with the necessary 
insight to formulate appropriate policies to effectively promote adherence to the rule of law with a view to boost foreign 
investors’ confidence in the economies and stimulate the inflow of FDI. 
Novelty/Originality of this study: This paper is amongst the first to utilize the PMG dynamic heterogeneous panel 
approach to explore the relationship of rule of law with the inflow of FDI in the six SSA countries. 
Keywords: FDI, PMG, Panel Approach, Rule of Law, SSA. 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is basically an investment in tangible assets undertaken by an investor in another 
country different from that of the investor. Such investment usually relates to a huge commitment of resources involving 
long term relationships with the host country. These imply that FDI is not undertaken by Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) without significant consideration. FDI is generally regarded as a major source of augmenting domestic capital 
by developing countries to meet their gross investment requirement. Consequently, attracting FDI is considered an 
integral part of the economic development agenda and strategies pursued by emerging and developing economies 
(UNCTAD, 2014). The significance of FDI is inherently connected to economic development through the deepening of 
capital, technology spillover, employment generation, human capital development, access to international markets and 
enhanced international trade (Javorcik, 2004; Aziz et al., 2019; Lipsey, 2002; Jalil et al., 2012). As such, FDI plays an 
essential role in developing economies by bridging three key developmental gaps involving investment gap, tax revenue 
gap and foreign exchange gap (Epaphra & Massawe, 2017). 
The critical role of FDI in the economic development process has compelled several developing economies desirous of 
FDI inflow to pursue numerous policies and strategies through various incentives and adjustments of their 
macroeconomic environment in a bid to entice FDI. Though, UNCTAD statistics reveal a substantial increase in global 
FDI flow from USD13.3 billion in 1970 to USD54.4 billion in 1980, USD204.9 billion in 1990 and USD 1,429.8 billion 
in 2017 with the corresponding rise in FDI inflow to developing economies including Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
economies. However, the actual performance of SSA in the enticing inflow of FDI is not encouraging considering the 
fact that the percentage of global FDI attracted to the region declined from 6.3 percent in 1970 to 3.1 percent in 1982, 
2.4 percent in 2010 and 2.1 percent in 2017. This dwindling performance is attributed to several a factor among which is 
the weak institutional environment in SSA countries (Rodríguez-Pose & Cols, 2017). 
Although scholars have been exploring to identify key determinants of FDI, the focus has been mainly on economic 
factors such as exchange rates, economic growth, market size, infrastructure and labour costs, among others (Grosse & 
Trevino, 1996; Majid et al., 2019; Dunning, 1980; Caves, 1974). However, the influential work of North (1990) has 
largely influenced the focus of researchers towards scrutinizing the role of institutional environment in attracting FDI 
inflow (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Gastanaga et al., 1998; Loree & Guisinger, 1995). Accordingly, it is widely 
believed that institutional factors are of great concern to foreign investors since they affect the costs, operational 
efficiencies and risks of conducting business in host locations (Wei, 2000; Hassan et al., 2014). Hence, several scholars 
argued that on the whole, MNCs are disposed to a conducive environment for FDI activities (Gani & Al-Abri, 2013; 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).  
Nonetheless, most of the prior works that interrogated the relationship of the institutional environment and FDI 
concentrated on composite institutional quality with few focusing on specific factors such as corruption and political 
stability (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Nasir et al., 2020; Kim, 2010; Godinez & Liu, 2015). Against this background and 
considering the inability of SSA countries to draw the anticipated inflow of FDI after decades of concerted efforts 
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through various incentives and adjustments of their macroeconomic environment, this study explores the impact of rule 
of law on FDI inflow in a panel of six selected SSA countries comprising three from the low-income countries, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania and Senegal and three from lower-middle-income countries consisting of Nigeria, Congo Republic, and Sudan 
during the long-run (LR) as well as short-run (SR).  
Rule of law (ROL) involves the citizens and residents abiding by the law of the society which regulates and guides their 
conduct. It is the framework for ensuring the security, safety, and peace required to guarantee reasonable transaction 
costs and sustain economic activities (Fogel, 2006). The sustenance of the rule of law requires an effective crime control 
mechanism and an efficient court system to safeguard life and properties as well as the rights of citizens. Globerman and 
Shapiro (2003) argued that an impartial, transparent and effective legal system encourages FDI since it is a major 
consideration for an investment decision. However, it is widely believed that the application of rule of law is poor in 
most of the SSA countries, due to weak institutional environment which has been affecting the ability of the countries to 
attract FDI inflow. This is evidently reflected in the scores of the selected SSA countries in the World Bank ROL index 
as reflected in Table 1: 
Table 1: Rule of Law Indicator of the Selected SSA Countries, 2004 – 2017 
Year Ethiopia Tanzania Senegal Nigeria Congo 
Republic 
Sudan Average 
2004 -0.86 -0.36  0.00 -1.41 -1.19 -1.54 -0.89 
2005 -0.94 -0.28  0.01 -1.35 -1.47 -1.63 -0.94 
2006 -0.66 -0.44 -0.22 -1.07 -1.27 -1.36 -0.84 
2007 -0.65 -0.37 -0.24 -1.07 -1.24 -1.40 -0.83 
2008 -0.70 -0.35 -0.28 -1.04 -1.20 -1.42 -0.83 
2009 -0.83 -0.48 -0.37 -1.15 -1.22 -1.24 -0.88 
2010 -0.80 -0.49 -0.40 -1.16 -1.22 -1.31 -0.90 
2011 -0.74 -0.51 -0.46 -1.18 -1.20 -1.28 -0.90 
2012 -0.68 -0.53 -0.29 -1.15 -1.14 -1.23 -0.84 
2013 -0.65 -0.47 -0.24 -1.11 -1.11 -1.27 -0.81 
2014 -0.47 -0.40 -0.08 -1.05 -1.11 -1.17 -0.71 
2015 -0.51 -0.37 -0.14 -0.96 -1.08 -1.21 -0.71 
2016 -0.49 -0.38 -0.11 -1.02 -1.10 -1.26 -0.73 
2017 -0.45 -0.45 -0.15 -0.87 -1.10 -1.11 -0.69 
Average -0.67 -0.42 -0.21 -1.11 -1.18 -1.31 -0.82 
 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
The ROL index in Table 1 which is measured on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 reveals that all the selected SSA countries have 
not done well from the assessment of the application of rule of law. The index indicates that all the countries score below 
the average of 0.00 between 2004 and 2017, except Senegal which scores 0.00 and 0.01 in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
Furthermore, the cumulative average score of -0.82 for the six countries during the period is far below average 
performance. Accordingly, the general performance of the selected countries clearly shows that observance of the rule of 
law is a major challenge in the countries. This is believed to be part of the obstacles inhibiting FDI inflow to the 
economies since foreign investors are apprehensive of arbitrariness in policy decisions which makes investment 
environment unpredictable. Moreover, it has been shown that effective judicial system and rule of law stimulates FDI 
inflow (Jadhav, 2012; Büthe & Milner, 2014). Accordingly, the abysmal performance of the selected countries on the 
rule of law index could be partly responsible for the inability of the countries to entice substantial inflow of FDI as 
reflected in Table 2. 
The performance of the six selected SSA countries in attracting FDI inflow between 2004 and 2017 in Table 2 depicts 
that all the countries witnessed a relative increase in FDI inflow despite the fluctuations observed during the period. 
Though, the FDI inflow of USD1,065 million received by Sudan in 2017 is lower than the USD1,511 million recorded in 
2004. Nevertheless, the cumulative average inflow of FDI for all the countries increased by only 23.6 percent from 
USD1,404 million in 2005 to USD1,838 million in 2017. This implies that SSA countries are having difficulties enticing 
the desired inflow of FDI after concerted efforts. Considering such a circumstance, there is a need for more robust 
investigations. 
Table 2: FDI Inflow (USD Million) of the Selected SSA Countries, 2004 – 2017 
Year Ethiopia Tanzania Senegal Nigeria Congo 
Republic 
Sudan Average 
2004 545 331 77 2,127 -8,000 1,511 -568 
2005 265 936 45 4,978 585 1,617 1,404 
2006 545 403 220 4,898 554 1,842 1,410 
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2007 222 582 297 6,087 1,468 1,504 1,693 
2008 109 1,383 398 8,249 2,032 1,653 2,304 
2009 221 953 320 8,650 1,273 1,726 2,191 
2010 288 1,813 266 6,099 928 2,064 1,910 
2011 627 1,229 338 8,915 186 1,734 2,172 
2012 279 1,800 276 7,127 -283 2,311 1,918 
2013 1,344 2,087 311 5,608 609 1,688 1,941 
2014 1,855 1,416 403 4,694 1,659 1,251 1,880 
2015 2,627 1,561 409 3,064 3,802 1,728 2,199 
2016 3,989 1,365 472 4,449 3,565 1,064 2,484 
2017 3,586 1,180 532 3,503 1,159 1,065 1,838 
Source: UNCTAD, 2018 
There are several theoretical exploits providing explanations on FDI and the behaviour of MNCs. However, the famous 
eclectic theorem of Dunning (1977) has provided an elaborate theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of 
FDI, due to its ability to relate ownership, location as well as internalization (OLI) factors as specific attributes that tend 
to guide investment decisions of MNCs. Dunning (2001) argued that a firm needs three key conditions to be regarded as 
MNCs. The first being the ownership advantage which relates to the ownership of certain specific assets that enable 
MNC to have an advantage over local firms in the host location, such that the advantage would compensate for 
additional costs of operating in a foreign location. The second condition involves the internalization advantage where the 
firm is able to internalize the benefits of FDI to reduce transaction costs, curtail technology imitation and use effective 
management to safeguard the reputation of the firm. The third condition is the location advantage which involves certain 
attributes in a location which could affect the operations and profitability of MNC such as quality of infrastructure, cost 
of labour, market size, investment incentives, institutional quality, availability of natural resources and any other feature 
which could serve as an advantage in the host country that MNCs could explore to enhance their efficiency and 
profitability (Dunning, 1988; Ajide & Raheem, 2016).  
Within the framework of location advantages of the eclectic paradigm, several empirical exploits were undertaken to 
scrutinize the role of institutional factors in stimulating inflow of FDI in different contexts. Recently, some studies have 
specifically focused on the connection of rule of law with FDI inflow, though there is no unanimity on the nature of the 
nexus. For instance, Staats and Biglaiser (2012), Gammoudi and Cherif (2015), Büthe and Milner (2014), Jandhyala, 
(2013), Al-Khouri (2015), Jadhav (2012), Anyanwu (2012), Azam et al. (2012), Karim et al. (2012), Rodríguez-Pose and 
Cols (2017), Jeong (2014), Osabutey and Okoro (2015), Ahmad and Ahmed (2014), Gangi and Abdulrazak (2012), Hoa 
and Lin (2016), Lee et al. (2014), Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015), Fung and Garcia-Herrero (2012), De Beule and 
Duanmu (2012), Ferreira and Ferreira (2016), Różański and Sekuła (2016) and Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) have 
documented from their studies in various contexts that the relationship of rule of law with FDI is positively significant, 
insisting that improvement in the level of adherence to the rule of law stimulates FDI inflow.  
On the contrary, Bellos and Subasat (2012) and Subasat and Bellos (2013) reported from their analysis of selected 
transition economies and countries of Latin American, respectively that rule of law has an inverse relationship with FDI, 
arguing that lack of observance of rule of law is not an impediment, but a means of encouraging FDI inflow. On their 
part, Khan and Akbar (2013), Al-Khouri and Khalik (2013), Gobinda and Haider (2014), Bannaga et al. (2013), Kurul 
and Yalta (2017) and Saidi et al. (2013) concluded from their various empirical investigations that ROL has insignificant 
influence on the inflow of FDI. 
Accordingly, there seem to be limited empirical works on the nexus of the ROL with FDI inflow in SSA countries. 
Though the majority of the prior investigations have validated the positive bearing of rule of law on FDI inflow from 
different empirical investigations that are mostly outside the SSA, there appears to be no consensus. In response to these 
conflicting outcomes and since most of the previous studies utilized static panel estimation technique in their analysis 
(Kurul & Yalta, 2017), this study adds to the prevailing literature by employing Pooled Mean Group (PMG) model 
offered by Pesaran et al. (1997, 1999) to explore the relationships between the rule of law and FDI over the LR as well 
as SR in the selected SSA countries. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized thus: Section two describes the data as well as the methodological 
framework of the study, while Section three showcases and discusses the results. Finally, Section four concludes the 
paper. 
METHODOLOGY  
The model for examining the effect of the rule of law on FDI inflow is specified in Equation (1): 
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where FDI is as previously reflected and ROL is the rule of law. REG is regulatory quality and INFL is the inflation rate, 
whereas NATR and OPEN are natural resources availability and trade openness, correspondingly. In addition,   is 
constant and   is the coefficient, while i denote the country subscript, t signifies a period of time and   is basically the 
error term. Following Gani and Al-Abri (2013), Asiedu (2002)and Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015), the measurement of 
FDI is the rate of annual FDI inflow to GDP. The data of FDI is obtained from the UNCTAD database. The key variable 
of concern is the ROL and the range of the index is -2.5 through 2.5 with -2.5 signifying absence of ROL and 2.5 
denoting total observance of ROL. The index has been widely used in numerous related works (Bannaga et al., 2013; 
Gani & Al-Abri, 2013; Ajide & Raheem, 2016).  
In line with existing literature (Epaphra & Massawe, 2017; Asiedu, 2006; Chakrabarti, 2001), some variables that could 
have an influence on FDI (REG, INFL, NATR & OPEN) are included as control variables in the model. Regulatory 
quality reflects the quality of the country’s regulatory framework and the index is measured on a range of -2.5 to 2.5. 
Inflation reflects macroeconomic stability and its measurement is the annual percent change in the CPI. The NATR is the 
proportion of annual rents realized from natural resources in relation to GDP, whereas trade openness is the rate of total 
annual import and export to GDP. 
The data for this study consists of an annual time series data set of the six SSA countries from 1996 to 2017. The period 
of the study is selected based on data availability for the variables. The data for ROL and REG were obtained from 
Worldwide Governance indicators Index, while the data for the remaining variables were accessed from World 
Development Indicators.  
This study utilizes the PMG dynamic heterogeneous panel approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (1997, 1999). In panel 
data econometric techniques, the accommodation of individual heterogeneity can be achieved through the estimation of 
individual equations in respect of each cross-section and obtaining average of the parameter estimates. This can be 
achieved with the Mean Group (MG) estimation model advanced by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Although, MG could be 
a consistent estimator, but may not necessarily be efficient with regards to averaging heterogeneous parameters. On the 
other hand, the cross-sections could be pooled with the application of the Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) model proposed 
by Weinhold (1999). This method provides for different intercepts, but the slope parameters of all cross-sections would 
be identical. However, this assumption could be highly restrictive which may produce potentially misleading estimates 
in respect of parameters’ average values in the dynamic model, except the slope coefficients are actually identical 
(Simões, 2011). 
The PMG as an intermediate estimator provides a balance between the two varying approaches by exploring the 
advantages of the two methods. The PMG estimator enables the coefficients of the SR to vary across the countries or 
cross-sections which are similar to the MG estimator, whereas the coefficients of the LR are constrained to be the same 
in respect of all cross-sections, which is similar to DFE model. Also, the PMG estimator assumes the error terms to be 
serially uncorrelated and distributed independently, thereby treating explanatory variables as exogenous. In addition, 
there is the assumption of LR relationships amongst the dependent variable(DV) and regressors. Another interesting 
feature with regards to the model is that it can be applied regardless of variables’ integration order whether I(0), I(1) or 
mixed. The Hausman test can be employed to determine the suitability of the estimators between PMG and MG and also 
between DFE and MG based on the consistency as well as the efficiency of their properties (Pesaran et al., 1999; 
Simões, 2011). 
The estimations of LR, as well as SR coefficients of PMG model, are specified in Equation (2) and Equation (3): 
                                                                                         
                          
 
   
              
  
   
              
  
   
              
  
   
               
  
   
 
             
  
   
                        
where   and   are the coefficients, whereas p denotes the lag of the DV and q stands for the lag of explanatory variables. 
In addition, ECT is the error correction term, while    is the coefficient of ECT and adjustment speed approaching LR 
equilibrium. The rest is as described in the preceding Equation. 
RESULTS/DISCUSSION 
This section involves data analysis as well as the results of empirical analysis and findings. The summary of descriptive 
statistics is provided in Table 3, whereas the correlation matrix is reflected in Table 4. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FDI 4.021 6.224 -2.071 45.833 
ROL -0.848 0.494 -1.709 0.066 
REG -0.863 0.433 -1.560 -0.048 
INFL 9.956 14.230 -8.484 132.824 
NATR 18.023 15.739 0.184 61.945 
OPEN 0.760 0.581 0.179 2.511 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Variable FDI ROL REG INFL NATR OPEN 
FDI  1.000 
     
 
----- 
     ROL  -0.166 1.000 
    
 
(0.057) ----- 
    REG  -0.201 0.868 1.000 
   
 
(0.021) (0.000) ----- 
   INFL  -0.158 -0.317 -0.301 1.000 
  
 
(0.070) (0.000) (0.001) ----- 
  NATR  0.280 -0.519 -0.501 -0.167 1.000 
 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) ----- 
 OPEN  0.294 -0.099 -0.253 -0.296 0.578 1.000 
 
(0.001) (0.261) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) ----- 
According to Hassan et al. (2014), the process of panel data analysis essentially commences with a stationary test to 
detect the presence of unit roots in respect of the series. Accordingly, the series of stationary properties were examined 
with Im et al. (2003) IPS unit root test of the panel. The results in Table 5 show that FDI, REG and INFL are stationary 
at level, while ROL, NATR, and OPEN are stationary at first difference. These imply a mixed order of integration not 
exceeding I(1), which is ideal for the PMG model.  




Level First Difference 
 W-statistic Probability W-statistic Probability 
FDI -4.471  0.000* -12.344 0.000* 
ROL -0.448  0.327 -13.156 0.000* 
REG -1.803  0.036** -12.774 0.000* 
INFL -8.562  0.000* -8.774 0.000* 
NATR -0.348  0.364 8.884 0.000* 
OPEN -0.213  0.416 -7.703 0.000* 
To select the appropriate model and avoid cross-sectional dependence, the process of ascertaining the suitability of 
PMG, MG or DFE model for the panel analysis involves the conduct of the Hausman test with the estimated parameters 
of the models. Table 6 showcases the estimated results with respect to the models and Hausman test results. 
Table 6: Selection among the Three Dynamic Panel Data Methods 
 Pooled Mean Group  
(PMG) 
Mean Group  
(MG) 
Dynamic Fixed Effect  
(DFE) 
 Long-Run Estimations 
Variable Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability 
ROL -1.886 0.023** -0.254 0.933 -2.677  0.661 
REG 0.524 0.501 -2.993 0.393 -5.465  0.441 
INFL -0.052 0.032** 0.082 0.250 -0.096  0.348 
NATR 0.031 0.027** -0.204 0.285 -0.412  0.001* 
OPEN -1.108* 0.091*** -2.095 0.552 2.515  0.309 
Short-Run Estimations 
Variable Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability 
ECT -0.646 0.000* -0.966 0.000*  -0.597  0.000* 
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ROL_D1 3.042 0.147 2.964 0.376  6.277  0.150 
REG_D1 0.698 0.505 -0.422 0.871 2.388  0.569 
INFL_D1 -0.059 0.394 -0.023 0.455 0.024  0.574 
NATR_D1 -0.092 0.301 0.057 0.379  -0.005  0.953 
OPEN_D1 1.078 0.489 -2.810 0.160  -1.700  0.665 
C 2.145 0.000* 11.185 0.236 2.080  0.623 
 Hausman Tests 
Test Between Probability Choice 
PMG/MG 0.189 PMG 
DFE/MG 0.123 DFE 
Note: *, ** and *** signify significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, correspondingly 
The Hausman test result between PMG and MG reveals a probability value of 18.9 percent, which implies that PMG is 
the most suitable model over MG since the probability value from the test result is above five percent (Blackburne & 
Frank, 2007). Likewise, the Hausman test result between DFE and MG indicates a probability value of 12.3 percent 
which is above five percent. Hence, DFE should be selected over MG. However, since the Hausman test result between 
PMG and MG is in favour of PMG, there will be no need to consider the test result between DFE and MG. Overall, 
PMG is the selected model. 
Having ascertained the stationary properties of the series and the selection of PMG as the appropriate model, what 
follows is the estimation of the model’s coefficients. Table 7 and Table 8 depict the results of the LR as well as SR 
relationships estimated with the model (5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) selected by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).  
Table 7: Results of LR Estimation. Dependent Variable: FDI 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability 
ROL 1.783 0.727 2.452  0.017** 
REG -2.298 0.684 -3.360 0.001* 
INFL -0.100 0.012 -8.027 0.000* 
NATR 0.035 0.011 3.121 0.003* 
OPEN -0.262 0.155 -1.691  0.096*** 
Note: *, ** and *** signify significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, correspondingly 
The results of the LR estimation depicted in Table 8 show that the coefficient of ROL is positive and also statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. This signifies that the ROL has a positive association with FDI inflow in the 
selected SSA countries during the long-run. It denotes that an increase in the degree of adherence to the ROL by one unit 
in the rule of law index causes FDI inflow to increase by 1.78 percent of GDP in the selected countries over the long-
run. This implies that on average, an improvement in adherence to the rule of law will strengthen the framework of 
undertaking business activities in the countries, thereby boosting the confidence of foreign investors to invest in the 
economies. In the same vein, a decline in the degree of observance of rule of law and arbitrariness in policies application 
tend to weaken investors’ confidence and their willingness to invest in the economies. The result of this study follows 
the outcome of the works of Lee et al. (2014), Karim et al. (2012), Azam et al. (2012), Hoa and Lin (2016) and 
Rodríguez-Pose and Cols (2017)which have concluded that ROL is significant for stimulating FDI inflow. The 
coefficients of all the control variables are significant. Natural resources availability has a direct association with FDI, 
whereas regulatory quality, inflation, as well as trade openness, have an inverse relationship with FDI during the long-
run.  
Table 8: Results of SR Estimation. Dependent Variable: FDI 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability 
ECT  -0.803 0.319  -2.518  0.015** 
ΔFDI (-1) 0.283 0.321 0.884 0.380 
ΔFDI (-2) 0.363 0.243 1.495 0.140 
ΔFDI (-3) 0.434 0.211 2.052  0.044** 
ΔFDI (-4)  -0.067 0.144  -0.461 0.647 
ΔROL  -8.197 5.486  -1.494 0.140 
ΔREG 2.490 1.632 1.526 0.132 
ΔINFL 0.067 0.036 1.880  0.065*** 
ΔNATR  -0.114 0.135 -0.847 0.401 
ΔOPEN  3.198 6.729 0.475  0.636 
C  3.932 2.002 1.964  0.054*** 
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Note: *, ** and *** signify significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, correspondingly 
Furthermore, the estimated short-run results in Table 8 depict that the coefficient of ECT which measures adjustment 
speed approaching long-run equilibrium is negative, less than one as well as statistically significant at a 5% significance 
level. These signify a model fit and the presence of LR relationships amongst the DV and the explanatory variables. In 
addition, the speed of adjustment is very fast at 80.3% annually. The results also show that INFL and the lag value of 
FDI exert positive significant influence on FDI during the SR, whereas ROL and the remaining control variables are 
insignificant, implying that the rule of law does not impact FDI in the short-run, it requires time instead. 
CONCLUSION 
The enormous benefits connected with FDI have prompted developing economies to implement several reforms and 
pursue policies that are aimed at encouraging the inflow of FDI. However, the ability of various countries to attract the 
desired FDI inflow differs considerably. In this regard, SSA countries have been finding it difficult to attract the required 
FDI inflow after decades of concerted efforts, prompting various empirical exploits targeted at unraveling the key 
determinants of FDI in the region. This study, therefore, contributes to these drives by engaging PMG dynamic 
heterogeneous panel procedures to empirically explore the LR as well as the SR association between the ROL and FDI 
inflow in the six selected SSA countries over the period of 1996 to 2017. The study found that ROL has a significant 
direct influence on FDI inflow over the long-run in the selected countries, thereby supporting the dominant findings 
from prior studies. However, the relationship in the short-run appears to be insignificant. The study recommends that the 
SSA countries should strengthen their law enforcement mechanism and justice delivery system to enhance the level of 
observance of the rule of law. This will reduce the risks as well as uncertainties associated with the business 
environment and boost the confidence of foreign investors to invest in their economies. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
In spite of the attempt to make some contributions, this study is, however, not without limitations. The study covers only 
six countries from the low income and lower-middle-income countries in the panel analysis out of the several economies 
in the SSA region, due to data availability involving all the variables employed in the study. Future studies could expand 
the scope of the SSA countries to cover more economies including upper-middle-income countries. Furthermore, future 
investigations could involve time series analysis to examine the relationship of ROL with FDI inflow in the context of a 
specific country as more data becomes available. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
We appreciate the support of Universiti Utara Malaysia for providing the facilities and enabling environment for the 
conduct of this study.  
AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION  
The two authors contributed in conducting the study and preparing the paper. The first author prepared the Abstract, 
Introduction and Methodology sections of the paper, whereas the second and corresponding author worked on the 
Analysis, Results/Discussion, Conclusion and Limitation/Study Forward sections of the paper. 
REFERENCES 
1. Ahmad, M. H., & Ahmed, Q. M. (2014). Does the institutional quality matter to attract foreign direct 
investment? An empirical investigation for Pakistan. South Asia Economic Journal, 15(1), 55-70. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1391561414525708 
2. Ajide, K. B., & Raheem, I. D. (2016). Institutions-FDI nexus in ECOWAS countries. Journal of African 
Business, 17(3), 319-341. https://doi.org/10.1080/15228916.2016.1180778 
3. Al-Khouri, R. (2015). Determinants of foreign direct and indirect investment in the MENA region. The 
Multinational Business Review, 23(2), 148-166. https://doi.org/10.1108/MBR-07-2014-0034 
4. Al-Khouri, R., & Khalik, M. U. A. (2013). Does political risk affect the flow of foreign direct investment into 
the Middle East North African region? Journal of Global Business and Technology, 9(2), 47-59. 
5. Anyanwu, J. C. (2012). Why does foreign direct investment go where it goes? New evidence from African 
countries. Annals of Economics & Finance, 13(2), 425-462. 
6. Asiedu, E. (2002). On the determinants of foreign direct investment to developing countries: Is Africa 
different? World Development, 30(1), 107-119. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00100-0 
7. Asiedu, E. (2006). Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market size, government 
policy, institutions and political instability. The World Economy, 29(1), 63-77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9701.2006.00758.x 
8. Azam, M., Khan, M. A., & Iqbal, N. (2012). Impact of political risk and uncertainty on FDI in South 
Asia. Transition Studies Review, 19(1), 59-77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11300-012-0230-x 
9. Aziz, M. I., Adnan, A. A., Afthanorhan, A., Foziah, H., Ishak, S. I. & Rashid, N. (2019). The influence of 
employer value proposition in talent demand towards talent shortage in the Malaysian Islamic banking 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 2, 2020, pp 441-450 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8250 
448 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                               © Zangina and Hassan 
institutions: A SEM approach. Management Science Letters, 9(6), 843-850. 
https://doi.org/10.5267/j.msl.2019.3.004 
10. Bannaga, A., Gangi, Y., Abdrazak, R., & Al-Fakhry, B. (2013). The effects of good governance on foreign 
direct investment inflows in Arab countries. Applied Financial Economics, 23(15), 1239-1247. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09603107.2013.802088 
11. Bellos, S., & Subasat, T. (2012). Governance and foreign direct investment: A panel gravity model 
approach. International Review of Applied Economics, 26(3), 303-328. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2011.587110 
12. Blackburne III, E. F., & Frank, M. W. (2007). Estimation of nonstationary heterogeneous panels. The Stata 
Journal, 7(2), 197-208. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0700700204 
13. Büthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2014). Foreign direct investment and institutional diversity in trade agreements: 
Credibility, commitment, and economic flows in the developing world, 1971–2007. World Politics, 66(1), 88-
122. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887113000336 
14. Caves, R. E. (1974). Causes of direct investment: Foreign firms' shares in Canadian and United Kingdom 
manufacturing industries. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 56(3), 279-293. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1923965 
15. Chakrabarti, A. (2001). The determinants of foreign direct investments: Sensitivity analyses of cross-country 
regressions. Kyklos, 54(1), 89-114. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00142 
16. Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). Who cares about corruption? Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6), 807-
822. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400223 
17. Daude, C., & Stein, E. (2007). The quality of institutions and foreign direct investment. Economics and 
Politics, 19(3), 317-344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00318.x 
18. De Beule, F., & Duanmu, J. L. (2012). Locational determinants of internationalization: A firm-level analysis of 
Chinese and Indian acquisitions. European Management Journal, 30(3), 264-277. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2012.03.006 
19. Dunning, J. H. (1977). Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: A search for an eclectic approach. In 
B. Ohlin, P. O. Hesselborn and P. M. Wijkman (eds), The International Allocation of Economic Activity (pp. 
395–418). Holmes and Meier. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03196-2_38 
20. Dunning, J. H. (1980). Toward an eclectic theory of international production: Some empirical tests. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 11(1), 9-31. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490593 
21. Dunning, J. H. (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and some possible 
extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1), 1-31. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490372 
22. Dunning, J. H. (2001). The eclectic (OLI) paradigm of international production: past, present and 
future. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 8(2), 173-190. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13571510110051441 
23. Epaphra, M., & Massawe, J. (2017). The effect of corruption on foreign direct investment: A panel data 
study. Turkish Economic Review, 4(1), 19-54.  
24. Ferreira, M. P., & Ferreira, J. G. (2016). The impact of selected institutional environment dimensions of Sub-
Saharan countries on their ability to attract foreign direct investment. Revista Eletrônica de Negócios 
Internacionais, 11(1), 21-36. https://doi.org/10.18568/1980-4865.11121-36 
25. Fogel, K. (2006). Oligarchic family control, social-economic outcomes, and the quality of government. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 37(5), 603-622. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400213 
26. Fung, K. C., & Garcia-Herrero, A. (2012). Foreign direct investment outflows from China and India. China 
Economic Policy Review, 1(01), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793969012500033 
27. Gammoudi, M., & Cherif, M. (2015). Capital account openness, political institutions and FDI in the MENA 
region: An empirical investigation. Economics Discussion Papers, No. 2015-10. 
28. Gangi, Y. A., & Abdulrazak, R. S. (2012). The impact of governance on FDI flows to African countries. World 
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 8(2/3), 162-169. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/20425961211247761 
29. Gani, A., & Al-Abri, A. S. (2013). Indicators of the business environment, institutional quality and foreign 
direct investment in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. International Review of Applied 
Economics, 27(4), 515-530. https://doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2012.760066 
30. Gastanaga, V. M., Nugent, J. B., & Pashamova, B. (1998). Host country reforms and FDI inflows: How much 
difference do they make? World Development, 26(7), 1299-1314. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-
750X(98)00049-7 
31. Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2002). Global foreign direct investment inflows: The role of governance 
infrastructure. World Development, 30(11), 1899-1919. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00110-9 
32. Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2003). Governance infrastructure and US foreign direct investment. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 34(1), 19-39. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400001 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 2, 2020, pp 441-450 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8250 
449 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                               © Zangina and Hassan 
33. Gobinda Goswami, G., & Haider, S. (2014). Does political risk deter FDI inflow? An analytical approach using 
panel data and factor analysis. Journal of Economic Studies, 41(2), 233-252. https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-03-
2012-0041 
34. Godinez, J. R., & Liu, L. (2015). Corruption distance and FDI flows into Latin America. International Business 
Review, 24(1), 33-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.05.006 
35. Grosse, R., & Trevino, L. J. (1996). Foreign direct investment in the United States: An analysis by country of 
origin. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(1), 139-155. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490129 
36. Hassan, S., Abu Bakar, N. & Abdullah, H. (2014). Analysis of FDI inflows into China from ASEAN-5 
countries: A panel cointegration approach. Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development, 35(3), 1-28. 
37. Hassan, S., Othman, Z., & Harun, M. (2014). Ownership structure variation and firm efficiency. Asian Social 
Science, 10(11), 233. https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v10n11p233 
38. Hoa, D. T. T., & Lin, J. Y. (2016). Determinants of foreign direct investment in Indochina: A holistic 
approach. International Journal of Business and Applied Social Science, 2(1), 1-
10.https://doi.bde26068cf7de90a65d9d9cdbff18973f03c361e 
39. Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal of 
Econometrics, 115(1), 53-74. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(03)00092-7 
40. Jadhav, P. (2012). Determinants of foreign direct investment in BRICS economies: Analysis of economic, 
institutional and political factor. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 37(1), 5-14. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.03.270 
41. Jalil, A. Z. A., Harun, M., & Mat, S. H. C. (2012). Macroeconomic instability and fiscal decentralization: An 
empirical analysis. Prague Economic Papers, 2, 150-165. https://doi.org/10.18267/j.pep.416 
42. Jandhyala, S. (2013). Property rights and international investment in information technology services. Strategic 
Management Journal, 34(7), 877-889. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2032 
43. Javorcik, S. B. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In search of 
spillovers through backward linkages. American Economic Review, 94(3), 605-627. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464605 
44. Jeong, H. G. (2014). The determinants of foreign direct investment in the business services 
industry. International Economic Journal, 28(3), 475-495. https://doi.org/10.1080/10168737.2014.913651 
45. Karim, Z. A., Zaidi, M. A. S., Ismail, M. A., & Karim, B. A. (2012). The quality of institutions and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Malaysia. Asian Journal of Accounting and Governance, 3(1), 61-69. 
https://doi.org/10.17576/ajag-2012-3-6516 
46. Khan, M. M., & Akbar, M. I. (2013). The impact of political risk on foreign direct investment. MPRA Paper 
(No. W/P 47283). https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v5n8p147 
47. Kim, H. (2010). Political stability and foreign direct investment. International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 2(3), 59-71. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v2n3p59 
48. Kurul, Z., & Yalta, A. (2017). Relationship between institutional factors and FDI flows in developing countries: 
New evidence from dynamic panel estimation. Economies, 5(2), 17-26. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/economies5020017 
49. Lee, H., Biglaiser, G., & Staats, J. L. (2014). The effects of political risk on different entry modes of foreign 
direct investment. International Interactions, 40(5), 683-710. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.899225 
50. Lipsey, R. E. (2002). Home and host country effects of FDI. NBER Working Paper (No. W/P 9293). 
Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.3386/w9293 
51. Loree, D. W., & Guisinger, S. E. (1995). Policy and non-policy determinants of US equity foreign direct 
investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(2), 281-299. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490174 
52. Majid, N. A., Zainol, F. A., Wan Daud, W. N., & Afthanorhan, A. (2019). Cooperative entrepreneurship in 
Malaysian secondary schools: A review of current practices. Journal of Social Sciences Research, 5(3), 812-
818. https://doi.org/10.32861/jssr.53.812.818 
53. Nasir, M. N. M., Mohamad, M., Ghani, N. I. A., & Afthanorhan, A. (2020). Testing mediation roles of place 
attachment and tourist satisfaction on destination attractiveness and destination loyalty relationship using the 
phantom approach. Management Science Letters, 10(2), 443-454. https://doi.org/10.5267/j.msl.2019.8.026 
54. Nnadi, M., & Soobaroyen, T. (2015). International financial reporting standards and foreign direct investment: 
The case of Africa. Advances in Accounting, 31(2), 228-238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2015.09.007 
55. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional changes and economic performance. Cambridge University 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678 
56. Osabuohien, E. S., & Efobi, U. R. (2013). Africa's money in Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 81(2), 
292-306. https://doi.org/10.1111/saje.12012 
57. Osabutey, E. L., & Okoro, C. (2015). Political risk and foreign direct investment in Africa: The case of the 
Nigerian telecommunications industry. Thunderbird International Business Review, 57(6), 417-429. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.21672 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 2, 2020, pp 441-450 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8250 
450 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                               © Zangina and Hassan 
58. Pesaran, M. H., & Smith, R. (1995). Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 79-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01644-F 
59. Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., & Smith, R. P. (1997). Pooled estimation of long-run relationships in dynamic 
heterogeneous panels. DAE Working Papers Amalgamated Series, 9721. 
60. Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., & Smith, R. P. (1999). Pooled mean group estimation of dynamic heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94(446), 621-634. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1999.10474156 
61. Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Cols, G. (2017). The determinants of foreign direct investment in Sub‐Saharan Africa: 
What role for governance? Regional Science Policy & Practice, 9(2), 63-81. https://doi.org/10.1111/rsp3.12093 
62. Różański, J., & Sekuła, P. (2016). Determinants of foreign direct investment in developed and emerging 
markets. Dynamic Econometric Models, 16(1), 49-64. https://doi.org/10.12775/DEM.2016.005 
63. Saidi, Y., Ochi, A., & Ghadri, H. (2013). Governance and FDI attractiveness: Some evidence from developing 
and developed countries. Global Journal of Management and Business Research, 13(6), 1-11.  
64. Simões, M. C. (2011). Education composition and growth: A pooled mean group analysis of OECD 
countries. Panoeconomicus, 58(4), 455-471. https://doi.org/10.2298/PAN1104454S 
65. Staats, J. L., & Biglaiser, G. (2012). Foreign direct investment in Latin America: The importance of judicial 
strength and rule of law. International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), 193-202. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2478.2011.00690.x 
66. Subasat, T., & Bellos, S. (2013). Governance and foreign direct investment in Latin America: A panel gravity 
model approach. Latin American Journal of Economics, 50(1), 107-131. https://doi.org/10.7764/LAJE.50.1.107 
67. UNCTAD (2014). World investment report: Investing in the SDGs - An action plan. United Nations 
Publications, Geneva.  
68. Wei, S. J. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
82(1), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465300558533 
69. Weinhold, D. (1999). A dynamic fixed-effects model for heterogeneous panel data. London School of 
Economics. Mimeo.  
70. World Bank (2018). Worldwide governance indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank Publication.  
 
 
 
